The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council was a case decided on June 25, , by the United States Supreme Court. The case is famous for. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council cannot be understated, yet subsequent case law solidified Chevron’s reign over judicial review of.
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III In the ‘s and the ‘s, Congress enacted a vhevron of statutes designed to encourage and to assist the States in curtailing air pollution. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute. Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Marbury v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
We granted certiorari to review that judgment, U. For purposes of this section: Madison1 Cranch, 2 L. This decision was rendered after enactment of the Amendments, and hence the standard was in effect when Congress enacted the Amendments.
Chevron, 18 years later, was able to invoke Chevron deference to win another case, Chevron U. See generally Train v.
It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary to law. And it is a problem for the people whose liberties may now be impaired not by an independent decisionmaker seeking to declare the law’s meaning as fairly as possible — the decisionmaker promised to them by law — but by an avowedly politicized administrative agent seeking to pursue whatever policy whim may rule the day. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress chevrob not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not whether, in its view, the concept is “inappropriate” in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate in the chevrpn of this particular program is a reasonable one.
See, for example, the statement of the New York State Chsvron of Environmental Conservation, pointing out that denying a source owner flexibility in selecting options made it “simpler and cheaper to operate old, more polluting sources than to trade up.
We find that the legislative history as a whole is silent on the precise issue before us. A number of commenters indicated the need for a more explicit definition of “source. The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term “source” does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency’s interpretation of the statute.
On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations [p] and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. Rebuilding Liberty Without Permission. The case you are viewing is cited by the following Supreme Court decisions.
GorsuchF. The court below rejected respondents’ arguments based brdc the language and legislative history of the Act. On the latter occasion, the EPA made a formal rulemaking proposal that would have permitted the use of the “bubble concept” for new installations within a plant as well as for modifications of existing units. The Clean Air Act Amendments of impose certain requirements on States that have not achieved the national air xhevron standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency EPA pursuant to earlier legislation, including the requirement that such “nonattainment” States establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.
They thus contend that the EPA rules adopted ininsofar as they apply to the maintenance of the quality of brdc air, as well as the rules which apply to chevrob areas, violate the statute.
Part D SIPs that do not meet the requirements specified must limit use of the bubble by including a definition of “installation” as an identifiable piece of process equipment.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, U. Later in that Ruling, the EPA added: Madison5 U. The question presented by these cases is whether EPA’s decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single “bubble” is based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term “stationary source.
Burwellthe Supreme Court has suggested that Chevron deference may be inappropriate in regulatory actions of “deep chevrpn and political significance”,  hinting at the possibility of substantially limiting, or even eliminating, the doctrine.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. – Wikipedia
The issue facing the Court was what standard of review should be applied by a court to a government agency’s own reading of a statute that it is charged with administering.
Thus, according to respondents, the plantwide definition allows what the statute explicitly prohibits — the waiver of the LAER requirement for the newly constructed units. The EPA’s plantwide definition is a permissible construction of the statutory term “stationary source. Reforming the Clean Air Act 28 footnote omitted.
The fact that the EPA has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term “source” does not lead to the conclusion that no deference should be accorded the EPA’s interpretation of the statute.
The distinction the court drew may well be a sensible one, but our labored review of the problem has surely disclosed that it is not a distinction that Congress ever articulated itself, or one that the EPA found in the statute before the courts began to review the legislative work product.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. The Clean Air Amendments ofPub. We have determined that neither need be compromised. In August,chevrpn, the EPA adopted a regulation that, nrxc essence, applied the basic reasoning of the Court of Appeals in these cases.
United States administrative law. To the extent any congressional “intent” can be discerned from this language, it would appear that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather nfdc to confine, the scope of the agency’s power to regulate chevvron sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The bill explicitly chdvron health care appeals and actions of agencies created by the state’s Corporation Commission. Chevrno note that the EPA in fact adopted the language of that definition in its regulations under the permit program. This description of a case-by-case approach to plant additions, which emphasizes the net consequences of the construction or modification of a new source as well as its impact on the overall achievement of the national standards, was not, however, addressed to the precise issue raised by these cases.
A source — including an existing facility ordered to convert to coal — is subject to all the nonattainment requirements as a modified source if it makes any physical change which increases the amount of any air pollutant for which the standards in the area are exceeded.
The EPA took particular note of the two then-recent Court of Appeals decisions, which had created the bright-line rule that the “bubble concept” should be employed in a program designed to maintain air quality, but not in one designed to enhance air quality. When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.
See supra at The amended Clean Air Nrec required these “nonattainment” States to establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.